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Abstract 
This study examines State obligations to prevent and redress corporate-related human rights violations 
under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It 
discusses the evolving jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in two areas of 
international legal doctrine of particular relevance to the business and human rights debate: the 
application of international human rights obligations to non-state actors (the public-private divide); and 
the jurisdictional scope of international human rights treaties (the territoriality-extraterritoriality divide). 
The study revises and updates a 2010 contribution to the mandate of the Special Representative of the 
United Nations Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Entities John Ruggie. The INTRODUCTION offers an overview of the global regulatory 
framework on business and human rights. PART B systematises the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) on the public-private divide in terms of two categories of State obligations: 
negative obligations to respect human rights in relation to corporations acting as state agents; and 
positive obligations to protect human rights in relation to corporations acting as third parties. PART C 
discusses the ECtHR’s approach to the extraterritorial dimension of State obligations to prevent and 
redress corporate-related human rights violations. The study discusses cases of direct extraterritorial 
jurisdiction (acts ‘performed’ outside the State’s territory) and extraterritorial effects cases (acts 
‘producing effects’ outside the State’s territory), and their respective relevance to the business and 
human rights domain. Consideration is also given to the growing body of case law on the extraterritorial 
dimension of the human right to remedy, which remains a pressing concern in the business and human 
rights domain. 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
The global regulatory framework on business and human rights 
The first edition of this study was prepared in support of the mandate of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Entities (SRSG).1 It complemented the SRSG’s own reports on State responsibilities to regulate and 
adjudicate corporate activities under the core UN human rights treaties,2 and two studies conducted on 
the Inter-American and the African regional human rights systems.3 The global regulatory framework 
on business and human rights has undergone significant changes since the original publication of the 
study.  
In June 2011, the UN Human Rights Council endorsed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNGPs) that evolved out of the SRSG’s ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework.4 
The UNGPs build on three pillars: (i) the state duty to protect human rights against violations by third 
parties, including corporations; (ii) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, meaning to act 
with due diligence to avoid infringing the rights of others; and (iii) greater access to effective remedies, 
both judicial and non-judicial, for victims of corporate human rights abuse. Following the end of the 
SRSG’s mandate, a UN Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Entities was established to promote the ‘effective and comprehensive dissemination 
and implementation’ of the UNGPs.5 The SRSG was not asked to develop a new international legal 
instrument on business and human rights but merely to ‘elaborate the implications of existing standards 
and practices for states and businesses’.6 Accordingly, the UNGPs’ treatment of state duties to regulate 
and adjudicate corporate activities impairing human rights remains firmly rooted in the traditional state-
centred conception of international law: 
At present, States are not generally required under international human rights law to regulate the 
extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they 
generally prohibited from doing so, provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis. Within these 
parameters some human rights treaty bodies recommend that home States take steps to prevent abuse 
by business enterprises within their jurisdiction.7 
The second significant development since the original publication of this study is the further elaboration 
of the extraterritorial dimension of the state duty to protect human rights against corporate abuse by the 
                                                     
1 D. Augenstein, ‘State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, Submission to the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (April 2011). 
2 H. R. C., ‘State responsibilities to regulate and adjudicate corporate activities under the United Nations core human rights 
treaties’, A/HRC/4/35/Add.1 (13 February 2007); H. R. C., ‘State obligations to provide access to remedy for human rights 
abuses by third parties, including business: an overview of international and regional provisions, commentary and 
decisions’, A/HRC/11/13/Add.1 (15 May 2009). 
3 C. Anicama, ‘State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the Inter-American Human Rights 
System (April 2008); South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law, 
‘The State Duty to Protect, Corporate Obligations and the Extraterritorial Application in the African Regional Human 
Rights System’ (February 2010). 
4 H. R. C., ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations’ “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011). 
5 H. R. C., ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities’, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (06 July 2011). 
6 Id. para 14. 
7 Id. para 2. 
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UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies. In 2011, a consortium of academics and civil society organisations 
adopted the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights that advocate a more progressive approach to international law in the area of 
business and human rights.8 In the same year, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) published a statement on human rights and the corporate sector in which it called upon States 
to ‘take steps to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by corporations which have their main seat 
under their jurisdiction, without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the obligations of the host 
States under the Covenant’.9 In its 2016 draft General Comment, CESCR further specifies that 
‘extraterritorial obligations arise when a State Party may exercise control, power or authority over 
business entities or situations located outside its territory, in a way that could have an impact on the 
enjoyment of human rights’. These obligations extend ‘to any business entity over which [a State Party] 
may exercise influence by regulatory means or by the use of incentives’.10 The other international human 
rights treaty bodies have espoused similar views. 
It is doubtful whether current state practice supports such an extensive interpretation of international 
legal obligations to protect against extraterritorial corporate human rights abuse.11 In the wake of the 
UNGPs, some states have adopted so-called ‘home-state’ or ‘parent-based’ legislation to regulate 
corporate human rights impacts with extraterritorial effect.12 However, there is little evidence that states 
adopt such legislation in recognition of a corresponding obligation in international human rights law.13 
The perceived weakness of international law in addressing extraterritorial corporate human rights abuse 
has rekindled debates about the need for an international business and human rights treaty.14 In 
2014, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution establishing another intergovernmental 
working group tasked with developing an ‘international legally binding instrument on transnational 
                                                     
8 ‘Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
(Maastricht: 2011), published with extensive commentary in 34 Human Rights Quarterly (2012) 1084-1169. 
9 C. E. S. C. R., ‘Statement on the obligations of States Parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural 
rights’, E/C.12/2011/1 (12 July 2011) para 5. 
10 C. E. S. C. R., ‘Draft General Comment on State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities’, E/C.12/60/R.1 (17 October 2016) paras 33, 36. 
11 In February 2017, CESCR organised a one-day consultation on its draft General Comment that was positively received by 
some States, while rejected by others; see  
      http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21210&LangID=E. 
12 In this regard, the SRSG has recommended that states consider the use of ‘domestic measures with extraterritorial 
implications’. Different from ‘jurisdiction exercised directly in relation to actors or activities overseas’, such measures rely 
‘on territory as the jurisdictional basis, even though [they] may have extraterritorial implications’; see H. R. C., ‘Business 
and Human Rights: Further Steps towards the Operationalisation of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, 
A/HRC/14/27 (9 April 2010) para 48. 
13 The United Kingdom’s National Action Plan (NAP) implementing the UNGPs is instructive in this regard. The 2016 update 
of the NAP lists two examples of home-state or parent-based legislation: the UK Bribery Act that provides for liability of 
companies in the UK for acts of bribery committed anywhere in the world; and the Modern Slavery Act whose disclosure 
and transparency requirements extend to the global supply chains of companies carrying out business in the UK. At the 
same time, the NAP makes clear that the UK adopts a narrow (territorial) view of human rights jurisdiction: ‘Human rights 
obligations generally apply only within a State’s territory and/or jurisdiction. Accordingly, there is no general requirement 
for States to regulate the extraterritorial activities of business enterprises domiciled within their jurisdiction, although there 
are limited exceptions to this, for instance under the treaty regimes’; see HM Government, ‘Good Business: Implementing 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (May 2016) para 11. 
14 An earlier attempt to directly impose human rights obligations on corporations in international law had failed to garner the 
necessary support of states and business enterprises; see U. N. Economic and Social Council, ‘Draft Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12 (26 August 2003). 
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corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’.15 A first draft is expected 
before the end of 2017. 
Business and human rights in the Council of Europe and the European Convention System 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is 
a regional international treaty drafted within the Council of Europe (CoE), an international organisation 
formed after the Second World War. The ECHR entered into force in 1953 and has been ratified by all 
47 Member States of the Council of Europe.  
In October 2010, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation on 
human rights and business in which it called upon States parties ‘to explore ways and means to enhance 
the role of businesses in respecting and promoting human rights’. This should include ‘examining the 
feasibility of elaborating a complementary legal instrument, such as a convention or an additional 
protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights’.16 In March 2016, the CoE’s Committee of 
Ministers adopted another recommendation concerning the implementation of the UNGPs in Europe. 
As concerns the state duty to protect human rights (first pillar), it calls upon Member States to: 
• Apply such measures as may be necessary to require business enterprises operating within their 
territorial jurisdiction to respect human rights; 
• Apply such measures as may be necessary to require, as appropriate, business enterprises 
domiciled within their jurisdiction to respect human rights throughout their operations abroad; 
• Encourage and support these business enterprises by other means so that they respect human rights 
throughout their operations.17 
With regard to access to remedy (third pillar), Member States should ensure that their domestic courts 
are competent to adjudicate civil claims concerning business-related human rights abuses ‘against 
business enterprises domiciled within their jurisdiction’.18 
The ECHR and its protocols focus on the protection of civil and political rights.19 However, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has clarified that there is no watertight division separating 
civil and political rights from social, economic and cultural rights.20 Accordingly, the Court has 
interpreted a range of civil and political rights as also protecting social and economic interests. This 
includes the right to life (Article 2 ECHR), freedom from forced labour (Article 4 ECHR), the right to 
respect for home and private and family life (Article 8 ECHR), freedom of association (Article 11 
ECHR), the protection of property (Article 1, Protocol No. 1), the right to education (Article 2, Protocol 
No. 1), and freedom from discrimination (Article 14 ECHR and Protocol No. 12). 
Member States of the Council of Europe are not required to give direct effect to the ECHR in their 
domestic law. What is sufficient is that they provide an equivalent standard of human rights protection. 
The status and rank of the ECHR is determined by Member States’ domestic legal systems. The ECtHR 
understands its role as a supervisory one and generally leaves States a certain measure of discretion (a 
                                                     
15 H. R. C., ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business      
enterprises with respect to human rights’, A/HRC/RES/26/9 (14 July 2014). 
16 CoE Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Human Rights and Business’, Recommendation 1936 (2010). 
17 CoE Committee of Ministers, ‘Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on human 
rights and business’ (2 March 2016) para 13. 
18 Id. para 34. 
19 Social and economic rights are protected through another Council of Europe treaty, the European Social Charter (ESC). 
Compliance with the ESC falls outside the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and is instead 
monitored by the European Committee of Social Rights. 
20 See E. Ct. H. R., Case of Airey v Ireland (Judgment of 9 October 1979). 
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‘margin of appreciation’) in complying with their obligations under the European Convention. What 
sets the ECHR apart from other international human rights treaties is its remarkably effective legal 
machinery.21 The Court has compulsory jurisdiction. Pursuant to Article 34 ECHR, ‘the Court may 
receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming 
to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the 
Convention or the Protocols thereto’. The Court’s judgments are legally binding in international law 
(Article 46(1) ECHR). Apart from declaratory relief, the Court can also award ‘just satisfaction’ to the 
injured party (Article 41 ECHR). The execution of judgments is monitored by the CoE’s Committee of 
Ministers. 
All Member States of the European Union (EU), but not the EU itself, are parties to the ECHR. Article 
6(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon provides for accession 
of the EU to the ECHR. However, in Opinion 2/13 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
raised concerns about a full-fledged ECtHR supervision of EU acts, which has quashed hopes of a 
speedy accession.22 Article 6(3) TEU states that the European Union ‘shall respect fundamental rights, 
as guaranteed by the European Convention … as general principles of law’ and the CJEU has 
consistently treated the ECHR as one of the sources of EU human rights protection, alongside the EU’s 
own Charter of Fundamental Rights. Until accession, the ECtHR will not admit complaints brought 
directly against the European Union. However, the Strasbourg Court has entertained indirect complaints 
against EU acts in cases brought against EU Member States. The ECtHR’s case law in this area is 
characterised by a tension between facilitating the accession of CoE Member States to other international 
organisations and ensuring an effective protection of European Convention rights in relation to these 
international organisations.23 
Focus and scope of the study 
The study highlights existing state obligations under the European Convention to regulate and control 
corporate activities impairing human rights, and to ensure access to justice and effective remedies in 
cases of corporate-related human rights violations. Yet the study also identifies procedural and 
substantive standards developed in the case law of the ECtHR that can serve as guidance for States to 
enhance the protection of human rights against corporate abuse even where they are not legally required 
to do so. 
The study discusses the evolving jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in two areas of 
international legal doctrine particularly relevant to business and human rights: the application of 
international human rights obligations to violations committed by non-state actors (the public-private 
divide); and the jurisdictional scope of international human rights treaties (the territoriality-
extraterritoriality divide). The interaction between these two areas of legal doctrine lies at the heart of 
many difficulties of international law in accounting for human rights violations committed in the course 
of global business operations. Put crudely, the ECHR has traditionally confined human rights obligations 
to the relationship between public authorities and private individuals located on the state’s territory. This 
                                                     
21 See H. Keller & A. Stone Sweet, A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford University 
Press: 2008). Until 1999, the Strasbourg legal machinery also comprised a European Commission of Human Rights that 
handled the admissibility of individual applications. Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR abolished the Commission. A three-
judge Committee now rules on the admissibility of a case. Admissible cases are put before a seven-judge Chamber, which 
can refer cases to a Grand Chamber consisting of seventeen judges. 
22 Ct. J. E. U., Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU – Draft International Agreement – Accession of the European Union 
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – Compatibility of the Draft 
Agreement with the EU and FEU Treaties, Opinion 2/13 of the Court (18 December 2014).  
23 In the well-known Bosphorus case, the ECtHR established a rebuttable presumption that EU law would ensure standards of 
human rights protection equivalent to those of the ECHR; see E. Ct. H. R., Bosphorus v Ireland (Judgment of 30 June 
2005), applied in E. Ct. H. R., Avotins v Latvia (Grand Chamber Judgment of 23 May 2016). 
State obligations to regulate and adjudicate corporate activities under the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
European University Institute 5 
legal compartmentalisation of human rights within and between public and territorial states fails to 
address a core concern in the business and human rights domain, namely human rights obligations of 
the home state of the parent or controlling company of ‘multi-national’ corporations domiciled within 
its territorial jurisdiction to protect third-country victims against extraterritorial corporate human rights 
abuse. 
PART B discusses the application of the European Convention to human rights violations involving 
non-state actors, including corporations. Cases in this area involve among others media corporations, 
privately run hospitals and schools, and trade unions. There is also a robust body of case law on human 
rights protection against corporate abuse in the environmental sphere.24 Finally, there is a considerable 
number of cases concerning access to justice and effective remedies for corporate-related human rights 
violations. 
PART C considers the ECtHR’s approach to the extraterritorial dimension of the state duty to 
prevent and redress corporate-related human rights violations. It discusses both cases of direct 
extraterritorial jurisdiction (acts ‘performed’ outside the state’s territory) and extraterritorial effects 
cases (acts ‘producing effects’ outside the state’s territory) and their respective relevance to the business 
and human rights domain.25 Consideration is given to the growing body of case law scrutinising state 
measures to control cross-border movements of people, and to the extraterritorial dimension of the right 
to remedy which remains a pressing concern in the business and human rights domain.26 
The study focuses on cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights and the (now defunct) 
European Commission of Human Rights in the period from 2000 to 2017. While priority was given to 
cases in which the ECtHR directly addresses State obligations to regulate and adjudicate corporate 
activities, a systematic analysis of these obligations also required the inclusion of case law involving 
other non-State actors. The discussion of the extraterritorial dimension of the State duty to prevent and 
redress human rights violations draws on cases involving both State and non-State actors. 
The State duty to prevent and redress corporate-related human rights violations  
Introduction 
According to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, ‘States must protect against 
human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business 
enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse 
through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication’.27 Specifically with regard to the 
‘state-business nexus’, the UNGPs note that ‘where a business entity is controlled by the State or where 
its acts can be attributed otherwise to the State, an abuse of human rights by the business enterprise may 
entail a violation of the State’s own international law obligations’.28 
The text of the ECHR does not suggest that the European Convention directly imposes human rights 
obligations on non-state actors, including corporations. Article 1 ECHR only requires States to ‘secure’ 
human rights to ‘everyone within their jurisdiction’. Correspondingly, Article 34 ECHR only permits 
applications to the Court by individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation by a State. This 
                                                     
24 See further C. o. E., ‘Manual on Human Rights and the Environment (Strasbourg: 2012, 2nd edn.). 
25 For an overview see E. Ct. H. R., ‘Factsheet: Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction of States Parties to the European Convention on 
Human Rights‘ (February 2016). 
26 See, for example, H. R. C., ‘Business and Human Rights: Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy’, A/HRC/L.19 
(29 June 2016). 
27 See UNGPs (n 3) para 1. 
28 Id. para 4. 
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notwithstanding, the Court tends to refer to ‘violations’ (as opposed to ‘abuse’) of human rights by non-
state actors.29 In other cases, the ECtHR appears to directly ascribe human rights duties to non-state 
actors. In Von Hannover, the Court justified a private media corporation’s freedom of expression with 
reference to its corresponding duty to impart information to the public. Although the press ‘must not 
overstep certain bounds, in particular respect for the reputation and rights of others, its duty is 
nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information 
and ideas on all matters of public interest’.30  
Nevertheless, according to the still prevailing view corporations and other non-state actors only incur 
duties to protect human rights through domestic legislation implementing States’ international human 
rights obligations.31 This means, on the one hand, that the European Convention treats corporations 
more akin to private individuals (as bearers of human rights entitlements) than to public authorities (as 
bearers of human rights obligations).32 It entails, on the other hand, that the ECHR ensures corporate 
compliance with human rights only indirectly via (negative and positive) state obligations.33 
The nature of State obligations to secure human rights in relation to corporate activities 
The ECtHR has interpreted the requirement that States ‘secure’ the rights and freedoms of the European 
Convention to everyone within their jurisdiction (Article 1 ECHR) as imposing negative and positive 
obligations on public authorities. Negative obligations require States to abstain from unjustified 
interference with, and thereby to respect, human rights. Positive obligations require States to ensure the 
effective realisation of human rights even in the face of events for which they do not bear direct 
responsibility.34 Negative and positive state obligations come to bear on corporate human rights abuse 
via the doctrines of direct attribution and third-party responsibility. Negative obligations require states 
to respect human rights in relation to corporations acting as state agents; positive obligations 
require states to protect human rights in relation to corporations acting as third parties. While, in 
the first case, acts of corporations are attributed to the state so that the latter is considered to directly 
interfere with human rights, in the second case the state violates its human rights obligations by failing 
to take all reasonable and appropriate measures to protect individuals against corporate abuse. 
In practice, the distinction between negative and positive obligations can be difficult to draw because 
both the issues of direct attribution and third-party responsibility ultimately turn on a normative 
assessment of the relationship between the state and the non-state actor violating human rights, which 
                                                     
29 See, for example, E. Ct. H. R., Cyprus v. Turkey (Grand Chamber Judgment of 10 May 2001) para 81. The terminology of 
human rights ‘abuse’ is commonly used to indicate that non-state actors infringing human rights do not have corresponding 
international legal obligations to protect them. 
30 E. Ct. H. R., Von Hannover v. Germany (Judgment of 24 June 2004) para 58. 
31 According to the Human Rights Committee, obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ‘are 
binding on States Parties and do not, as such, have direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law. The Covenant 
cannot be viewed as a substitute for domestic criminal or civil law; H. R. Cm., ‘The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’, General Comment No 31, CCPR/c/21/Rev.1/Add.1326 (29 March 2004) para 
8. 
32 Critically on this ‘jurisdictional filter’ A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press: 
2006) 349-352. 
33 In a similar vein, the Human Rights Committee considers that the ‘obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights 
will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its 
agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights’; 
see ‘General Comment No. 31’ (n 30) para 8. 
34 See, for example, E. Ct. H. R., Marckx v. Belgium (Judgment of 13 June 1976); Goodwin (Christine) v. United Kingdom 
(Judgment of 11 July 2002); X and Y v. Netherlands (Judgment of 26 March 1985); Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’ v. 
Austria (Judgment of 21 June 1986). It should be noted that the distinction between negative and positive state obligations 
cannot be mapped one-to-one onto the distinction between the state duty to respect and the state duty to protect human 
rights, as the state duty to respect can entail negative as well as positive human rights obligations. 
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must be determined on a case-by-case basis. At the same time, the ECtHR has held that the relevant test 
for justifying an interference with human rights is broadly similar in both constellations: 
The boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations … do not lend themselves to 
precise definition. The applicable principles are, none the less, similar. In both contexts, regard must 
be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and 
of the community as a whole; in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation.35 
In Fadeyeva, the ECtHR elaborates the distinction between negative and positive state obligations and 
the conditions under which States are required to secure human rights against corporate abuse.36 The 
applicants lived in vicinity of the largest Russian steel plant owned and operated by a private 
corporation. Pollution levels from the plant had for many years exceeded permitted levels and were 
found to cause the applicant’s severe health problems. The applicant had applied numerous times to be 
resettled outside the plant’s ‘sanitary security zone’ that separates the industrial site from the town’s 
residential areas: 
The Court notes that, at the material time, the Severstal steel plant was not owned, controlled, or 
operated by the State. Consequently, the Court considers that the Russian Federation cannot be said 
to have directly interfered with the applicant’s private life or home. At the same time, the Court points 
out that the State’s responsibility in environmental cases may arise from a failure to regulate private 
industry. Accordingly, the applicant’s complaints fall to be analysed in terms of a positive duty on the 
State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicant’s rights under Article 8(1) 
of the Convention. … 
The Court concludes that the authorities in the present case were certainly in a position to evaluate the 
pollution hazards and to take adequate measures to prevent or reduce them. The combination of these 
factors [including the exercise of public control over the plant’s industrial activities] shows a sufficient 
nexus between the pollutant emissions and the State to raise an issue of the State’s positive obligations 
under Article 8 of the Convention.37 
Fadeyeva is also instructive as concerns the different levels of scrutiny the ECtHR applies depending 
on whether what is at stake is the breach of a negative or a positive state obligation. Reiterating that in 
cases of ‘direct interference by the State’ (breach of a negative obligation) and in cases of ‘the breach 
of a positive duty’, the applicable principles are ‘broadly similar’,38 the Court holds that 
Direct interference by the State with the exercise of Article 8 rights will not be compatible with 
paragraph 2 unless it is ‘in accordance with the law’. The breach of domestic law in these cases would 
necessarily lead to a finding of a violation of the Convention.However, where the State is required to 
take positive measures, the choice of means is in principle a matter that falls within the Contracting 
State’s margin of appreciation. There are different avenues to ensure ‘respect for private life’, and 
even if the State failed to apply one particular measure provided by domestic law, it may still fulfil its 
positive duty by other means. Therefore, in those cases the criterion ‘in accordance with the law’ of 
the justification test cannot be applied in the same way as in cases of direct interference by the State.39 
Failing direct attribution of corporate conduct to the State, the recognition of positive obligations 
mitigates the fact that the European Convention does not directly bind non-state actors (so-called indirect 
horizontal effect). However, whereas negative obligations constitute duties of result, positive 
                                                     
35 E. Ct. H. R., Keegan v Ireland (Judgment of 26 May 1994) para 49. 
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October 2006). 
37 Id. paras 89, 92. 
38 Id. para 94. 
39 Id. paras 95, 96. 
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obligations merely impose duties of (diligent) conduct on the State - to do what is reasonable and 
appropriate in protecting human rights. Moreover, that private corporations are also entitled to human 
rights protection under the European Convention means that at the justification stage their rights need 
to be balanced against, and can outweigh, the human rights of individual applicants.40 
Negative obligations to respect human rights in relation to corporations acting as State agents 
For negative human rights obligations to arise, corporate conduct must be directly attributable to the 
State so that the act of the private business entity can be treated as an act of the State itself. Under the 
domestic law of many CoE Member States and under European Union law, corporate activities can be 
treated as an act of the State by virtue of state ownership and control, by virtue of the corporation 
exercising public functions, or by virtue of a combination of both.41 The European Court of Human 
Rights uses a combination of different criteria to determine on a case-by-case basis whether 
corporate activities are directly attributable to the State: 
• The corporation’s legal status (under public law / as a separate legal entity under private law); 
• The rights conferred upon the corporation by virtue of its legal status (for example, the conferral 
of rights normally reserved to public authorities); 
• The corporation’s institutional independence from the State (including state ownership); 
• The corporation’s operational independence from the State (including de lege or de facto state 
supervision); 
• The nature of the corporate activity (‘public function’ or ‘ordinary business’, including the 
delegation of core state functions to private entities); 
• The context in which the corporate activity is carried out (for example, the relevance of the activity 
for the public good; privatised state industries with a monopoly position in the market). 
In Yershova, the applicant complained that her former employer, a municipal corporation, had failed to 
pay her a sum of money awarded in a judgment following her dismissal.42 The ECtHR had to decide 
whether the State was directly responsible for the corporation’s failure to serve its debts or whether it 
had merely failed to enforce a judgment against the corporation as a third party: 
In deciding whether the municipal company’s acts or omissions are attributable under the Convention 
to the municipal authority concerned, the Court will have regard to such factors as the company’s 
legal status, the rights that such status gives, the nature of the activity it carries out and the context in 
which it is carried out, and the degree of its independence from the authorities. The Court will notably 
have to consider whether the company enjoyed sufficient institutional and operational independence 
from the State to absolve the latter from its responsibility under the Convention for its acts and 
omissions.43 
                                                     
40 See further M. Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies: Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection (Oxford 
University Press: 2006). 
41 In Germany, for example, legal entities under private law which are wholly State owned are directly bound by fundamental 
rights, whereas in mixed legal entities this only applies to the public shareholder. For the UK Human Rights Act 1998 to 
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between individuals; E. C. J., Case C-188/89 A. Foster and Others v. British Gas plc [1990] ECR I-3313, para 20. 
42 E. Ct. H. R., Yershova v. Russia (Judgment of 8 April 2010); applied by Alisic and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Grand Chamber Judgment of 16 July 2014). 
43 Id. para 55. 
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Notably, the Court dismissed the defendant Government’s argument that the municipal company was 
incorporated under domestic law as a separate legal entity, which should absolve the State from 
responsibility for its debts. The corporation’s legal status, while important, was ‘not decisive for the 
determination of the State’s responsibility for the company’s acts or omissions under the 
Convention’.44 The Court instead focused on the corporation’s lack of institutional and operational 
independence and the public nature of its functions: 
The Court notes that the company’s independence was limited by the existence of strong institutional 
links with the municipality and by the constraints attached to the use of the assets and property. … 
The company’s institutional links with the public administration were particularly strengthened in the 
instant case by the special nature of its activities. As one of the main heating suppliers of the city of 
Yakutsk, the company provided a public service of vital importance to the city’s population.45 
The ECtHR’s case law on what constitutes a ‘governmental organisation’ in the context of admissibility 
decisions under Article 34 ECHR is also of relevance for determining the conditions under which a 
corporation can be treated as an agent of the State. In Radio France the Court considered that 
[t]he category of ‘governmental organisation’ includes legal entities which participate in the exercise 
of governmental powers or run a public service under government control. In order to determine 
whether any given legal person … falls within this category, account must be taken of its legal status 
and, where appropriate, the rights that status gives it, the nature of the activity it carries out and the 
context in which it is carried out, and the degree of independence from political authorities.46 
In State Holding Company Luganskvigillya the Court held that the applicant corporation was a 
governmental organisation within the meaning of Article 34 ECHR because it was owned and managed 
by the State, had participated in the exercise of governmental powers, and exercised a public function.47 
In Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, by contrast, the ECtHR considered that even though ‘the 
applicant company was wholly owned by the State and currently an important part of its shares still 
belong to the State’, it should be considered a non-governmental organisation because it was run as a 
commercial business enterprise with sufficient institutional and operational independence from the 
State.48 
Positive obligations to protect human rights in relation to corporations acting as third parties 
As duties of (diligent) conduct, positive human rights obligations require States to take all reasonable 
and appropriate steps in protecting individuals against violations by non-state actors, including 
corporations. A number of positive obligations flow directly from the text of the European Convention, 
most prominently Article 1 ECHR that requires States to ‘secure’ human rights to everyone within their 
jurisdiction. Other positive obligations have been developed through the Court’s case-law on Article 2 
ECHR (right to life), Article 3 ECHR (freedom from torture), Article 4 ECHR (prohibition of slavery 
and forced labour), Article 5 ECHR (liberty and security of the person), Article 6 ECHR (access to 
justice), Article 8 ECHR (right to private and family life and home), Article 9 ECHR (freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion), Article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression), Article 11 ECHR (freedom 
of assembly and association), Article 13 ECHR (right to an effective remedy), Article 1 Protocol 1 (right 
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to property), and Article 2 Protocol 1 (right to education). It would appear that all human rights that can 
be infringed by non-state actors impose corresponding positive obligations on States.49 
In Appleby, the ECtHR elaborates the conditions under which States incur positive human rights 
obligations. The applicants had set up a stall in a local shopping centre owned and operated by a private 
corporation to publicly criticise plans of the municipal authority to build over a local recreation area. 
Before the Strasbourg Court, the applicants complained that the corporation’s request for them to leave 
the shopping centre infringed their rights to freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR): 
In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance that 
has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of the individual, the 
search for which is inherent throughout the Convention. The scope of this obligation will inevitably 
vary, having regard to the diversity of situations obtaining in Contracting States and the choices which 
must be made in terms of priorities and resources. Nor must such an obligation be interpreted in such 
a way as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.50 
It has been argued that the existence of positive obligations is furthermore conditioned by the State 
exercising full and effective control over the area in which the human rights violation takes place. 
Different from negative obligations that merely require the State to control the conduct of its own agents, 
positive obligations necessitate ‘a far greater degree of control over the area in question, control which 
allows the state to create institutions and mechanisms of government, to impose its laws, and punish 
violations thereof’.51 The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber judgment in Ilascu & Others versus Moldova & 
Russia mitigates this requirement. The case arose out of human rights violations committed by agents 
the ‘Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria’ (MRT), a separatist regime that controlled an area within the 
territory of Moldova. The Court held that ‘even in absence of effective control over the Transdniestrian 
region, Moldova still has a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, 
economic, judicial or other measures that are in its power to take and are in accordance with international 
law to secure the applicants the rights guaranteed in the Convention’.52 
Three main consequences flow from the recognition of positive state obligations: 
• States must take positive measures to secure in their domestic law the effective enjoyment of 
human rights; 
• States must protect human rights in the relationship between non-state actors; 
• States must use their position as public shareholders to ensure corporate compliance with human 
rights. 
States are under a positive obligation to secure in their domestic laws the individual’s legal status, rights 
and privileges necessary for an effective enjoyment of her human rights.53 In Wilson, the applicants 
petitioned the Strasbourg Court on grounds of alleged violations of Articles 10 and 11 ECHR (freedom 
of expression & assembly) because their employer corporations had offered them financial incentives 
to renounce their rights to collective bargaining. The UK House of Lords (now: UK Supreme Court) did 
                                                     
49 This corresponds to the view taken by the UN Human Rights Committee, according to which positive obligations attach to 
all human rights that ‘are amendable to application between private parties or entities’, see ‘General Comment No. 31’ (n 
30) para 8. 
50 E. Ct. H. R., Appleby & Others v United Kingdom (Judgment of 06 May 2003) para 40. 
51 M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Oxford University Press: 2011) 210. 
52 E. Ct. H. R., Ilascu & Others v. Moldova & Russia (Grand Chamber Judgment of 08 July 2004) para 331. Critical O. De 
Schutter, ‘Globalisation and Jurisdiction: Lessons from the European Convention on Human Rights’ 9 Centre for Human 
Rights and Global Justice Working Paper (New York University: 2005). 
53 See, for example, E. Ct. H. R., Airey v Ireland (Judgment of of 9 October 1979); Marckx v Belgium (Judgment of 13 June 
1976). 
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not find the companies’ actions contrary to domestic law. The ECtHR, by contrast, ruled that the State 
must uphold the rights of workers to use trade unions to represent them in negotiations with employers: 
The Court observes at the outset that although the essential object of Article 11 is to protect the 
individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the exercise of the rights protected, 
there may in addition be positive obligations to secure the effective enjoyment of these rights. In the 
present case, the matters about which the applicants complain ... did not involve direct intervention 
by the State. The responsibility of the United Kingdom would, however, be engaged if these matters 
resulted from a failure on its part to secure to the applicants under domestic law the rights set forth in 
Article 11 of the Convention. 
[The Court] considers that, by permitting employers to use financial incentives to induce employees 
to surrender important union rights, the respondent State has failed in its positive obligation to secure 
the enjoyment of the rights under Article 11 of the Convention. This failure amounted to a violation 
of Article 11, as regards both the applicant trade unions and the individual applicants.54 
States also have to protect human rights in the sphere of the relations between individuals 
themselves. The Court has recognised this principle inter alia in the context of the right to respect for 
private and family life (Article 8 ECHR),55 freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR),56 and freedom 
of association (Article 11 ECHR).57 In Ouranio Toxo, the Court justifies this principle having regard to 
the purpose of the European Convention to guarantee a ‘practical and effective’ protection of human 
rights: 
The Court has often reiterated that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are not 
theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective. It follows from that finding that a genuine and 
effective respect for freedom of association cannot be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State 
not to interfere; a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the purpose of Article 11 
nor with that of the Convention in general. There may thus be positive obligations to secure the 
effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of association even in the sphere of relations between 
individuals.58 
It follows that a privatisation of state functions or a delegation of public responsibilities to private bodies 
and individuals cannot absolve the State from its human rights obligations under the European 
Convention.59 Moreover, States can be held accountable for failures to regulate and control acts of 
private parties that violate the human rights of other individuals: 
The acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in acts of private individuals 
which violate the Convention rights of other individuals within its jurisdiction may engage the State’s 
responsibility under the Convention. Any different conclusion would be at variance with the 
obligation contained in Article 1 of the Convention’.60  
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One category of human rights obligations that does not neatly fit into the distinction between negative 
and positive duties concerns cases in which the state assumes the role of a public shareholder in a 
private corporation. Heinisch concerned an alleged violation of Article 10 ECHR (freedom of 
expression) due to the dismissal of an employee from a nursing home for whistle blowing.61 The nursing 
home was operated by Vivantes Netzwerk für Gesundheit GmbH, a limited liability company majority-
owned by the Land of Berlin. German domestic courts upheld dismissal of the employee. According to 
the Strasbourg Court, this decision violated Article 10 ECHR because it failed to strike a fair balance 
between the need to protect the employer’s reputation and the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. 
In the case at hand, public ownership did not lead to a direct attribution of corporate human rights 
violations to the State. Nor did the State simply appear as a public regulator in relation to the corporation 
as a third party. Rather, when balancing the interests of the employer and the employee, the ECtHR 
focussed on human rights obligations that the State incurs as a public shareholder of the corporation: 
The Court finds it relevant to note in this context that in the case at hand the employer is a State-owned 
company providing, inter alia, services in the sector of institutional care for the elderly. While the 
Court accepts that State-owned companies also have an interest in commercial viability, it 
nevertheless points out that the protection of public confidence in the quality of the provision of vital 
public service by State-owned or administered companies is decisive for the functioning and economic 
good of the entire sector. For this reason the public shareholder itself has an interest in investigating 
and clarifying alleged deficiencies in this respect within the scope of an open public debate. 
In the light of these considerations, the Court finds that the public interest in receiving information 
about the shortcomings in the provision of institutional care for the elderly by a State-owned company 
is so important in a democratic society that it outweighs the interest in protecting the latter’s business 
reputation and interests.62 
It remains to be seen to what extent this approach is generalizable beyond a (German) context where 
public shareholders in mixed legal entities are constitutionally bound to respect human rights. 
The scope of State obligations to secure human rights in relation to corporate activities 
The concrete scope and content of State obligations to prevent and redress corporate-related human 
rights violations depends to some extent on the human right in question. The study focuses on the 
growing body of case law concerning human rights violations in the environmental sphere.63 The 
ECHR offers protection against human rights violations caused by, among others, dangerous industrial 
activities; industrial emissions and pollution; waste collection, management, and disposal; and natural 
disasters. Cases in this area most commonly involve the right to life (Article 2 ECHR), the right to 
respect for private and family life and home (Article 8 ECHR), the protection of property (Article 1 
Protocol 1 ECHR) and the right to access to court (Article 6 ECHR). There is a discernible general 
pattern in cases involving corporate-related human rights violations in the environmental sphere. 
Corporate activity causes an environmental nuisance that interferes with the human rights of the 
applicant. The State fails to take all reasonable and appropriate measures to regulate and control the 
corporate activity, usually in violation of domestic law. The State fails to effectively investigate, 
adjudicate and redress the corporate human rights violation. 
Three types of State obligations to prevent and redress corporate human rights violations in the 
environmental sphere can be distinguished: 
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• Substantive obligations to regulate and control corporate operations including the licensing, 
setting up and supervision of dangerous activities and the provision of information about such 
activities to the general public; 
• Procedural obligations to ensure an informed decision-making process that involves public 
participation, public investigations, scientific studies and environmental impact assessments; 
• Obligations relating to law enforcement and the judicial process, including access to justice and 
the provision of effective remedies. 
Substantive and procedural State obligations to prevent corporate-related human rights violations 
The state obligation to prevent human rights violations in the environmental sphere through the 
regulation and control of corporate activities has a substantive and a procedural dimension. In Hatton, a 
case involving alleged violations of Article 8 ECHR due to an increase of night flights at privately owned 
and run Heathrow Airport, the ECtHR considered that ‘in cases involving State decisions affecting 
environmental issues, there are two aspects to the inquiry which may be carried out by the Court. First, 
the Court may assess the substantive merits of the government’s decision, to ensure that it is compatible 
with Article 8. Secondly, it may scrutinise the decision-making process to ensure that due weight has 
been accorded to the interests of the individual’.64 
As concerns the substantive limb of the ECtHR’s human rights supervision, States are under an 
obligation to regulate and control corporate activities in a way that strikes a fair balance between the 
rights of the individual affected by environmental pollution and the interests of the community as a 
whole. The ECtHR assesses whether ‘the State could reasonably be expected to act so as to prevent or 
put an end to the alleged infringement of the applicant’s rights’,65 or whether ‘the national authorities 
took the necessary steps to ensure the effective protection of the applicants’ rights’.66 Of relevance in 
this assessment is whether the State authorities were aware of the environmental problems, and whether 
they exercised sufficient control over the corporate activity by imposing operating conditions and 
supervising their implementation.67 
In Dubetska the applicants complained that the operation of a State-owned coalmine that was 
subsequently privatised negatively affected their health and their living environment (Article 8 ECHR). 
The Court found against the State because the Ukrainian authorities had been aware of the environmental 
harms caused by the mine for more than 12 years yet failed to take effective steps in protecting the 
applicants’ rights.68 In Lopez Ostra, the ECtHR held the defendant State responsible for violations of 
Article 8 ECHR caused by pollution (including fumes, noise and foul smells) emanating from a waste 
treatment plant owned and operated by a private corporation. The Court pointed out that while the 
national and local authorities ‘were theoretically not directly responsible for the emissions in question ... 
the town allowed the plant to be built on its land and the State subsidised the plant’s construction’. 
Subsequently, the State authorities repeatedly failed to secure the applicant’s rights against 
environmental pollution emanating from the plant. Accordingly, the Court held that ‘the State did not 
succeed in striking a fair balance between the interest of the town’s economic well-being – that of having 
a waste-treatment plant – and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right to respect for her home 
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and her private and family life’.69 Tatar concerned human rights violations caused by a massive cyanide 
spill in a goldmine owned and operated by a private corporation. The spill released 100,000 cubic metres 
of contaminated water into rivers crossing Romania, Hungary, Serbia and Bulgaria to the Black Sea. 
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 ECHR because the Romanian authorities had 
failed in their duty to assess the risks of the corporate activity and to take suitable measures to protect 
the rights of the applicants.70  
Öneryildiz, a case concerning an explosion in a waste-collection site that killed numerous of the 
applicant’s relatives, is instructive as to what the Court considers ‘reasonable’ and ‘necessary’ 
measures in the context of Article 2 and Article 8 ECHR: 
The positive obligation on States to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their 
jurisdiction ... must be construed as applying in the context of any activity, whether public or not, in 
which the right to life may be at stake, and a fortiori in the case of industrial activities, which by their 
very nature are dangerous, such as the operation of waste-collection sites. ... 
The positive obligation to take all appropriate steps to safeguard life for the purposes of Article 2 
entails above all a primary duty on the State to put in place a legislative and administrative framework 
designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life. 
This obligation indisputably applies in the particular context of dangerous activities, where, in 
addition, special emphasis must be placed on regulations geared to the special features of the activity 
in question, particularly with regard to the level of the potential risk to human lives. They must govern 
the licensing, setting up, operation, security and supervision of the activity and must make it 
compulsory for all those concerned to take practical measures to ensure the effective protection of 
citizens whose lives might be endangered by the inherent risks.71 
Another important aspect of state obligations to prevent human rights violations in the environmental 
sphere is the provision of essential information to the public about risks involved in the corporate 
activity. In Öneryildiz, the Court stressed that among the preventive measures, ‘particular emphasis 
should be placed on the public’s right to information ... which has already been recognised under Article 
8 [and] may also, in principle, be relied on for the protection of the right to life’.72 The state obligation 
to provide essential information is of a prospective and precautionary nature. In Guerra the Court found 
the State in violation of Article 8 ECHR because it had waited until the production in the factory had 
ceased to provide the applicants ‘with essential information that would have enabled them to assess the 
risks they and their family might run if they continued to live [in the town] particularly exposed to 
danger in the event of an accident in the factory’.73 In Tatar, one decisive consideration for finding 
Romania in violation of Article 8 ECHR was that the State had failed to inform the public about the 
risks bound up with the mining project (among others, by withholding the results of an environmental 
impact assessment), and to issue warnings after the accident.74 The applicants in Vilnes were divers 
employed by a private corporation to explore oil fields in the Norwegian Continental Shelf. The 
Norwegian authorities had failed to ensure that the applicants were sufficiently informed about the 
dangers of decompression sickness, as a consequence of which they suffered serious health damage 
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resulting in disabilities. The ECtHR held that ‘the public’s right to information’ should not be confined 
to risks that have already materialised but should count among the preventive measures to be taken, 
including in the sphere of occupational risks.75 Moreover, having regard to 
[t]he authorities’ role in authorising diving operations and in protecting the safety of such 
operations as well as the lack of scientific consensus at the time regarding the long-term 
effects of decompression sickness … a very cautious approach was called for. In the Court’s 
view it would therefore have been reasonable for the authorities to take the precaution of 
ensuring that the companies observe full transparency about the diving tables used and that 
the applicants, and other divers like them, receive information on the differences between 
tables, as well as on their concerns for the divers’ safety and health, which constituted 
essential information that they needed to be able to assess the risk to their health and to give 
informed consent to the risks involved. … By failing to do so the respondent State did not 
fulfil its obligation to secure the applicants’ right to respect for their private life, in violation 
of Article 8 of the Convention. 76 
As concerns the procedural limb of the ECtHR’s human rights supervision, State decisions in 
relation to corporate activities that may impact on human rights must be taken in a transparent and 
inclusive way that enables public authorities to evaluate in advance the risks involved in the corporate 
activity. Procedural obligations that the Court has derived from the ECHR include duties to enable public 
participation and to take into account the views of affected individuals; and duties to ensure an informed 
decision-making process that involves investigations, scientific studies, and environmental impact 
assessments. 
In Zammit Maempel, the ECtHR noted in connection with the procedural limb of its review that in cases 
involving environmental nuisances it is necessary ‘to consider all the procedural aspects, including the 
type of policy or decision involved’.77 Moreover, ‘a governmental decision-making process concerning 
issues of cultural, environmental and economic impact such as in the present case must necessarily 
involve appropriate investigations and studies in order to allow [public authorities] to strike a fair 
balance between the various conflicting interests at stake’.78 Taskin involved the decision by local 
authorities to grant a licence to a private corporation for the extraction of gold. On appeal by local 
residents, the Turkish Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision due to dangers posed to the 
environment by the use of cyanide in the mine. With considerable delay, the State ordered the closure 
of the mine, only to authorize the resumption of mining after a number of subsequent developments. 
The applicants petitioned the Court alleging violations of, inter alia, Article 8 ECHR: 
The Court reiterates that, according to its settled case law, whilst Article 8 contains no explicit 
procedural requirements, the decision-making process leading to measures of interference must be fair 
and such as to afford due respect for the interests of the individual as safeguarded by Article 8. It is 
therefore necessary to consider all the procedural aspects, including the type of policy or decision 
involved, the extent to which the views of individuals were taken into account throughout the decision-
making process, and the procedural safeguards available.79 
The Court furthermore held that the decision-making process must involve ‘appropriate investigations 
and studies’ that allow States ‘to predict and evaluate in advance the effects of those activities which 
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might damage the environment and infringe individuals’ rights’.80 Article 8 ECHR can also be engaged 
‘where the dangerous effects of an activity to which individuals concerned are likely to be exposed have 
been determined as part of an environmental impact assessment procedure in such a way as to establish 
a sufficiently close link with private and family life’.81 Finally, state regulation ‘must also provide for 
appropriate procedures, taking into account the technical aspects of the activity in question, for 
identifying shortcomings in the processes concerned and any errors committed by those responsible at 
different levels’.82 The Court will verify whether individuals concerned ‘were able to appeal to the courts 
against any decision, act, or omission where they consider that their interests or their comments have 
not been given sufficient weight in the decision-making process’.83 
States generally enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in deciding how to regulate and control corporate 
activities endangering human rights protection in the environmental sphere.84 In Hardy and Maile, a 
case concerning the regulation of the construction and regulation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
terminals, the ECtHR accepted that  
[n]ational authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to assess the 
requirements relating to the transport and processing of LNG in a particular local context and to 
determine the most appropriate environmental policies and individual measures while taking into 
account the needs of the local community. The Court has therefore repeatedly stated that in cases 
raising environmental issues the State must be allowed a wide margin of appreciation.85 
The margin of appreciation shrinks if State measures interfere with a ‘particularly intimate aspect of the 
individual’s private life’,86 as well as in cases of very severe threats to human rights. In Brincat, shipyard 
repair workers had been exposed to asbestos for a period of five decades. Despite being aware of the 
health risks caused by asbestos, the Maltese authorities failed to inform the workers about these risks 
and to take adequate measures to protect them. The ECtHR concluded that ‘in view of the seriousness 
of the threat at issue, despite the State’s margin of appreciation as to the choice of means’, the 
Government had failed ‘to satisfy its positive obligations, to legislate or to take other practical measures, 
under Articles 2 and 8 in the circumstances of the present case.87 A failure of national authorities to 
comply with domestic law also reduces the State’s margin of appreciation. In Lopez Ostra the waste-
treatment plant operated without the necessary licence; in Guerra the applicants were prevented from 
obtaining information that the State was under a statutory duty to provide; and in Taskin the local 
authorities failed to close the goldmine despite the fact that its operating permit had been annulled by 
the Supreme Administrative Court.88  
In other cases, ‘it remains open to the Court to conclude that there has been a manifest error of 
appreciation by the national authorities to strike a fair balance between the competing interests of 
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different private actors’.89 The ECtHR will only in ‘exceptional circumstances … revise the material 
conclusions of the domestic authorities’.90 Nevertheless, the State is under an obligation to prove that it 
acted with due diligence in striking a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests 
of the community as a whole: ‘It is certainly within the Court’s jurisdiction to assess whether the 
Government approached the problem with due diligence and gave consideration to the competing 
interests’.91 Both as regards substantive and procedural human rights obligations, ‘the onus is on the 
State to justify, using detailed and rigorous data, a situation in which individuals bear a heavy burden 
on behalf of the rest of the community’.92 
State obligations to redress corporate-related human rights violations 
Under the European Convention, States are duty-bound to investigate, punish and redress corporate 
human rights violations when they occur. Where the domestic legal framework itself is deficient, States 
can be obliged to introduce new or amend existing legislation. Administrative authorities are required 
to contribute to a proper administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law. Finally, domestic courts 
must have due regard to the European Convention when adjudicating private disputes between 
corporations and individual victims of human rights violations. 
Of particular significance in cases involving corporate-related human rights violations in the 
environmental sphere is the obligation of States to ensure that public authorities and private 
corporations comply with domestic law. A characteristic features of cases such as Guerra, Lopez, 
Taskin, Fadeyeva, Öneryildiz, and Tatar is that the industrial activities in question were conducted 
without the necessary licence and/or in violation of public safety requirements and domestic 
environmental laws and emission standards. In Taskin, the ECtHR emphasised that ‘the administrative 
authorities form one element of a State subject to the rule of law, and that their interests coincide with 
the need for a proper administration of justice. Where administrative authorities refuse or fail to comply, 
or even delay doing so, the guarantees enjoyed by a litigant during the judicial phase of the proceedings 
are rendered devoid of purpose’.93 The Court furthermore found Turkey in violation of Article 6 ECHR 
because the national authorities had ‘failed to comply in practice and within reasonable time’ with the 
judgments of the Turkish Administrative Court and Supreme Administrative Court, ‘thus depriving 
Article 6(1) of any useful effect’.94 
As seen, in Öneryildiz the Court stressed that Article 2 ECHR requires States to ‘put in place a legislative 
and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to 
life’, regardless of whether the activity in question is public or private.95 From this obligation, the Court 
derives a number of more concrete requirements concerning the State’s response to violations of the 
right to life: ‘Where lives have been lost in circumstances potentially engaging the responsibility of the 
State, [Article 2] entails a duty for the State to ensure, by all means at its disposal, an adequate response 
– judicial or otherwise – so that the legislative and administrative framework set up to protect the right 
to life is properly implemented and any breaches of that right are repressed and punished’.96 In 
particular, 
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The judicial system required by Article 2 must make provision for an independent and impartial 
official investigation procedure that satisfies certain minimum standards as to effectiveness and is 
capable of ensuring that criminal penalties are applied where lives are lost as the result of dangerous 
activities if and to the extent that this is justified by the findings of the investigation. In such cases, 
the competent authorities must act with exemplary diligence and promptness and must of their own 
motion initiate investigations capable of, firstly, ascertaining the circumstances in which the incident 
took place and any shortcomings in the operation of the regulatory system and, secondly, identifying 
the State officials or authorities involved in whatever capacity in the chain of events in issue.97 
The requirements of Article 2 ECHR also extend to criminal proceedings before domestic courts:  
The proceedings as a whole, including the trial stage, must satisfy the requirements of the positive 
obligation to protect lives through the law. ... The national courts should not under any circumstances 
be prepared to allow life-endangering offences to go unpunished. This is essential for maintaining 
public confidence and ensuring adherence to the rule of law and for preventing any appearance of 
tolerance of or collusion in unlawful acts. The Court’s task therefore consists in reviewing whether 
and to what extent the courts, in reaching their conclusion, may be deemed to have submitted the case 
to the careful scrutiny required by Article 2 of the Convention, so that the deterrent effect of the 
judicial system in place and the significance of the role it is required to play in preventing violations 
of the right to life are not undermined.98 
As public institutions of the State, domestic courts adjudicating private disputes between corporations 
and victims of human rights violations are directly bound by the European Convention. In Pla and 
Puncernau, the applicants complained that judgments by the Andorran High Court of Justice and the 
Constitutional Court concerning the regulation of succession in a private will violated their human rights 
under Article 8 ECHR in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination). While the 
ECtHR accorded the national courts a wide margin of appreciation in the interpretation of domestic 
private law, it left no doubt that such interpretation must be compatible with the requirements of the 
European Convention: 
The applicants confined themselves to challenging a judicial decision that had declared a private deed 
disposing of an estate to be contrary to the testatrix’s wishes. The only outstanding issue is that of the 
alleged incompatibility with the Convention of the Andorran courts’ interpretation of domestic law. … 
When ruling on disputes of this type, the national authorities and, in particular, the courts of first 
instance and appeal have a wide margin of appreciation. Accordingly, an issue of interference with 
private and family life could only arise under the Convention if the national courts’ assessment of the 
facts or domestic law were manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary or blatantly inconsistent with the 
fundamental principles of the Convention.
99  
In Kurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi, the applicants had been involved in a private-law dispute with their 
landlord corporation over the installation of a satellite dish on the tenancy building to receive TV 
programmes in their native language. The Swedish Court of Appeal found against the applicants and 
ruled that their tenancy agreement should be terminated, as a consequence of which they were evicted 
from the flat. The applicants petitioned the Strasbourg Court alleging a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
The Government contended that the case concerned a dispute between two private parties over a 
contractual obligation and that there had been no intervention by a public authority. The ECtHR, by 
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contrast, stressed that ‘Article 10 applies to judicial decisions preventing a person from receiving 
transmissions from telecommunications satellites’.100 Moreover, the decision of the Swedish Court of 
Appeal was subject to European human rights supervision: 
Admittedly, the Court is not in theory required to settle disputes of a purely private nature. That being 
said, in exercising the European supervision incumbent on it, it cannot remain passive where a national 
court’s interpretation of a legal act, be it a testamentary disposition, a private contract, a public 
document, a statutory provision or an administrative practice appears unreasonable, arbitrary, 
discriminatory or, more broadly, inconsistent with the principles underlying the Convention. 
In the present case ... the applicant’s eviction was the result of the [domestic] court’s ruling. The Court 
finds that the responsibility of the respondent State within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention 
for any resultant breach of Article 10 may be engaged on this basis. ... 
The responsibility of the respondent State having been established, the Court of Appeal’s ruling that 
the applicants’ tenancy agreement should be terminated because of their refusal to dismantle the 
satellite dish in question amounted to an ‘interference by a public authority’ in the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed by Article 10.101 
Of particular relevance to the business and human rights domain is the right of access to justice (Article 
6 ECHR) and the right to an effective remedy (Article 13 ECHR).102 Article 6(1) ECHR requires 
that litigants have effective access to court to vindicate their civil rights protected under domestic law: 
‘In civil matters one can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of access 
to the courts. … The principle whereby a civil claim must be capable of being submitted to a judge ranks 
as one of the universally recognised fundamental principles of law; the same is true of the principle in 
international law which forbids the denial of justice. Article 6(1) must be read in the light of these 
principles’.103 Article 13 ECHR guarantees an ‘effective remedy before a national authority’ to everyone 
who claims that their rights under the European Convention have been violated: ‘Where an individual 
has an arguable claim to be the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention, he should 
have a remedy before a national authority in order both to have his claim decided and, if appropriate, to 
obtain redress’.104 Where the scope of protection of both provisions overlaps, Article 13 ECHR is 
absorbed by Article 6 ECHR. 
Article 6 ECHR protects the right of access to court and a fair trial not only for the benefit of natural 
persons but also for the benefit of non-governmental organisations representing the interests of their 
members.105 In Gorraiz Lizarraga, the applicant association relied on Article 6(1) ECHR to complain 
that they had not been accorded a fair hearing in domestic judicial proceedings brought by them to hold 
the construction of a dam. The ECtHR accepted that the applicant association could be considered a 
‘victim’ within the meaning of Article 34 ECHR because ‘it was established for the specific purpose of 
defending its members’ interests against the consequences of the dam’s construction on their 
environment and homes’, including ‘the project’s impact on the property rights and lifestyles of [its] 
members due to the change in their place of residence’.106 In L’Erablière A.S.B.L., the French Conseil 
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d’Etat had dismissed on procedural grounds the application of an environmental non-profit organisation 
to review a planning permission for expanding a waste collection site. The ECtHR found in favour of 
the applicant association because the limitation of its right to access to court was disproportionate to the 
requirements of legal certainty and the proper administration of justice, and therefore contrary to Article 
6(1) ECHR.107 
In Steel and Morris, the Court had to consider fair trial rights under Article 6 in defamation proceedings 
brought by a multi-national corporation against NGO campaigners in the UK. The proceedings were 
complex and protracted, yet the campaigners had not qualified for legal aid, had represented themselves 
throughout most of the case, and had encountered difficulties in paying various administrative costs. In 
its judgment, the ECtHR recalled that ‘the Convention is intended to guarantee practical and effective 
rights. This is particularly so of the right of access to a court in view of the prominent place held in a 
democratic society by the right to a fair trial. It is central to the concept of fair trial, in civil as in criminal 
proceedings, that a litigant is not denied the opportunity to present his or her case effectively before the 
court and that he or she is able to enjoy equality of arms with the opposing side’.108 Furthermore, the 
Court ruled that whether the provision of legal aid was necessary for a fair hearing depended, inter alia, 
‘upon the importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the complexity of the 
relevant law and procedure, and the applicant’s capacity to represent him or herself effectively’.109 
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court held that 
The disparity between the respective levels of legal assistance enjoyed by the applicants and [the 
corporation] was of such a degree that it could not have failed, in this exceptionally demanding case, 
to have given rise to unfairness … The lack of procedural fairness and equality therefore gave rise to 
a breach of Article 10 in the present case.110 
Finally, States are under a human rights obligation to ensure an effective and timely enforcement of 
domestic judgments against private corporations. In Fuklev the applicant won a domestic lawsuit 
against his former employer for non-payment of wages. By the time of the judgment the employer 
corporation had gone insolvent. The ECtHR found the State in violation of Article 6 ECHR because the 
Ukrainian authorities had failed in their ‘positive obligation to organise a system for enforcement of 
judgments that is effective both in law and in practice and ensures their enforcement without undue 
delay’.111 The applicant in Margushin had been involved in complex legal proceedings with a 
commercial bank over the non-payment of money from his account following the 1998 financial crisis. 
After numerous appeals and retrials he was awarded and paid the full sum. Subsequently, he was 
awarded interests by a further judgment which was upheld on appeal. Upon petition by the bank, the 
domestic courts discontinued the enforcement of the judgment. The ECtHR dismissed Russia’s 
objection that the application was inadmissible ratione personae because it was directed against a 
commercial bank: ‘the applicant’s grievances concern non-enforcement of the judgment in his favour, 
which covered not only the bank’s refusal to repay the judgment debt but also the discontinuation of the 
enforcement proceedings by domestic courts’.112 The latter constituted a violation of Article 6 and 
Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European Convention because the State had failed in its positive obligation 
to protect the applicant’s right to property, which was pertinent ‘even in cases involving litigation 
between private individuals or companies’.113 
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Extraterritorial State obligations to prevent and redress corporate-related human rights 
violations  
Introduction 
As noted at the outset, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights have taken a rather 
cautious approach to the extraterritorial dimension of the state duty to protect against corporate-related 
human rights violations: 
At present, States are not generally required under international human rights law to regulate the 
extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they 
generally prohibited from doing so, provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis. Within these 
parameters some human rights treaty bodies recommend that home States take steps to prevent abuse 
by business enterprises within their jurisdiction.114 
Absent a ‘general requirement’ to protect human rights against extraterritorial corporate abuse, the 
SRSG focussed on the permissibility of State action to regulate and control corporate activities outside 
their territories in accordance with a recognised basis of jurisdiction in public international law: 
In the heated debates about extra-territoriality regarding business and human rights, a critical 
distinction between two very different phenomena is usually obscured. One is jurisdiction exercised 
directly in relation to actors or activities overseas, such as criminal regimes governing child sex 
tourism, which rely on the nationality of the perpetrator no matter where the offence occurs. The other 
is domestic measures with extraterritorial implications; for example, requiring corporate parents to 
report on the company’s overall human rights policy and impacts, including those of its overseas 
subsidiaries. The latter phenomenon relies on territory as the jurisdictional basis, even though it may 
have extraterritorial implications.115 
The SRSG’s distinction between ‘direct extraterritorial jurisdiction’ and ‘domestic measures with 
extraterritorial implications’ shifts the focus from States’ extraterritorial human rights obligations to 
their legal competence to assert authority outside their borders.116 As acknowledged by the UNGPs, the 
UN Treaty Bodies have taken a more progressive approach to extraterritorial human rights obligations. 
In its 2016 draft General Comment, for example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights considered that ‘extraterritorial obligations arise when a State Party may exercise control, power 
or authority over business entities or situations located outside its territory, in a way that could have an 
impact on the enjoyment of human rights’. Moreover, these obligations extend ‘to any business entity 
over which [a State Party] may exercise influence by regulatory means or by the use of incentives’.117 
The other UN Treaty Bodies have expressed similar views. 
The starting point for considering the extraterritorial dimension of State obligations to prevent and 
redress corporate-related human rights violations under the European Convention system is the 
jurisdiction clause of Article 1 ECHR: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention’. Although Article 1 
contains no explicit reference to ‘territory’, the ECtHR has traditionally favoured a primarily territorial 
interpretation of States’ international human rights obligations. As the Court said in its (at the time hotly 
debated) admissibility decision in Bankovic, the European Convention reflects an ‘essentially territorial 
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notion of jurisdiction’, with the consequence that ‘acts of Contracting Parties performed, or producing 
effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction by them … only in exceptional 
circumstances’.118 Extraterritorial human rights jurisdiction requires a qualified jurisdictional link 
between the State and an individual located outside its borders. The decisive question is whether an act 
that was performed, or produced effects, outside the State’s territory brought the individual under 
that State’s jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR: 
The Court notes that the real connection between the applicants and the respondent States is 
the impugned act which, wherever decided, was performed, or had effects, outside of the 
territory of those States (“the extra-territorial act”). It considers that the essential question to 
be examined therefore is whether the applicants and their deceased relatives were, as a result 
of that extra-territorial act, capable of falling within the jurisdiction of the respondent 
States.119 
While the bulk of Bankovic has meanwhile been overruled, the ECtHR still holds on to a ‘primarily 
territorial’ interpretation of Article 1 ECHR.120 Not dissimilar from the approach taken by the UNGPs, 
the ECtHR justifies this territorialisation of human rights obligations with reference to the rules of 
jurisdiction in general public international law and the sovereign territorial rights of third States: 
As to the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the relevant term in Article 1 of the Convention, the Court is satisfied 
that, from the standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional competence of a State is 
primarily territorial. While international law does not exclude a State’s exercise of jurisdiction extra-
territorially, the suggested bases of jurisdiction … are, as a general rule, defined and limited by the 
sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant States.121 
Yet different from the UNGPs, the Strasbourg Court ties States’ jurisdictional competence in public 
international law to extraterritorial human rights obligations. With this caveat in mind, the SRSG’s 
distinction between ‘direct extraterritorial jurisdiction’ and ‘domestic measures with extraterritorial 
implications’ can be mapped onto the ECtHR’s distinction between acts ‘performed’ outside the State’s 
territory and acts ‘producing effects’ outside the State’s territory.  
The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber judgment in Al Skeini – now the leading case on the extraterritorial 
application of the European Convention – outlines a number of constellations in which a State may be 
found to exercise jurisdiction outside its borders: 
The Court has recognised in its case-law that, as an exception to the principle of territoriality, a 
Contracting State’s jurisdiction under Article 1 may extend to acts of its authorities which produce 
effects outside its own territory. … 
Firstly, it is clear that the acts of diplomatic and consular agents, who are present on foreign territory 
in accordance with provisions of international law, may amount to an exercise of jurisdiction when 
these agents exert authority and control over others. … 
Secondly, the Court has recognised the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State 
when, through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, it exercises 
all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government. … 
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In addition, the Court’s case-law demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, the use of force by a 
State’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the individual thereby brought under the control 
of the State’s authorities into the State’s Article 1 jurisdiction. … 
Another exception to the principle that jurisdiction under Article 1 is limited to a State’s own territory 
occurs when, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, a Contracting State exercises 
effective control of an area outside that national territory.122 
Al Skeini concerned the death of six Iraqi nationals in an area in Southern Iraq that was under the military 
occupation and effective control of the United Kingdom. Recalling Bankovic, the ECtHR reiterated that 
‘a State’s jurisdictional competence under Article 1 is primarily territorial’ and that ‘jurisdiction is 
presumed to be exercised normally throughout the State’s territory’. Accordingly, ‘acts of the 
Contracting States performed, or producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of 
jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 only in exceptional circumstances’.123 The most notable 
developments in Al Skeini as compared to the Court’s admissibility decision in Bankovic are, first, a 
rejection of the ‘espace juridique’ doctrine according to which (extraterritorial) jurisdiction is 
confined to the territories of the Member States of the Council of Europe (as High Contracting Parties 
to the European Convention).124 And secondly, a clarification that jurisdiction is not an all or nothing 
concept but can be divided and tailored. This yields a more context-sensitive approach to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction that requires States to secure to an individual all human rights that are 
‘relevant to the situation of that individual’.125  
The following discussion of extraterritorial state obligations to prevent and redress corporate-related 
human rights violations follows the ECtHR’s distinction between acts ‘performed’ and acts 
‘producing effects’ outside the State’s territory. The study thus discusses: 
• State obligations to prevent corporate-related human rights violations in relation to acts 
performed outside the State’s territory; 
• State obligations to prevent corporate-related human rights violations in relation to acts 
producing effects outside the State’s territory; and 
• State obligations to redress corporate-related human rights violations committed outside the 
State’s territory.  
The overall focus is on what is a core concern in the business and human rights domain, namely the 
jurisdictional relationship as carved out by international human rights law between home states of 
corporate investment and victims of human rights violations committed by corporations as private (non-
state) actors on the territory of a third (host) state. As the ECtHR has not yet had many opportunities to 
pronounce on human rights violations involving ‘foreign’ corporations, the discussion of extraterritorial 
human rights obligations under the European Convention draws on cases involving both state- and non-
state actors. 
State obligations to prevent corporate-related human rights violations in relation to acts performed 
outside the State’s territory 
Following Al Skeini, the circumstances in which acts performed outside the State’s territory bring an 
individual under that State’s jurisdiction can be subsumed under three broad categories: effective control 
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over persons located outside the State’s territory; effective control over an area located outside the 
State’s territory; and the exercise of public powers on the territory of another State with the latter’s 
invitation, consent or acquiescence. The three categories can overlap and are not always clearly 
distinguished in the Court’s case-law. 
The earliest cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the European Convention concerned the exercise 
of State authority and control over persons located outside the State’s territory. In X versus the 
UK, for example, the (now defunct) European Commission of Human Rights considered it ‘clear ... from 
the constant jurisprudence of the Commission that authorised agents of a State, including diplomatic 
and consular agents, bring other persons or property within the jurisdiction of that State to the extent 
that they exercise authority over such persons or property. Insofar as they affect such persons or property 
by their acts or omissions, the responsibility of the State is engaged’.126 Öcalan is a prominent example 
of the ECtHR’s ‘control over persons’ test. The applicant, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, was arrested 
in Kenya by Turkish officials acting in cooperation with Kenyan authorities. He was then forcibly 
transferred to Turkey where he was detained and sentenced to death. According to the Court, ‘the 
applicant was under effective Turkish authority and was therefore brought within the “jurisdiction” of 
that State for the purpose of Article 1 of the Convention, even though in this instance Turkey exercised 
its authority outside its territory’.127 In its more recent Grand Chamber judgment in Jaloud, the Court 
unanimously held that the Netherlands asserted authority and control, and thus jurisdiction, over 
individuals who passed through a checkpoint under the command of the Dutch army in Iraq.128 
The same principles also apply to applicants on board of vessels outside the State’s territorial 
jurisdiction. The applicants in Medvedyev were crew members on a merchant ship (the ‘Winner’) that 
was intercepted by French authorities on the high seas. The applicants complained that they had been 
arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, and that they had been denied access to justice while on board of the 
ship. Sitting as Grand Chamber, the ECtHR unanimously held that given the defendant State had 
‘exercised full and exclusive control over the Winner and its crew, at least de facto, from the time of its 
interception, in a continuous and uninterrupted manner until they were tried in France, the applicants 
were effectively within France’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention’.129 
Similarly, the seminal case of Hirsi Jamaa concerned the interception by Italian authorities of protection 
seekers 35 nautical miles of the coast of Lampedusa, and their subsequent unlawful return to Libya. The 
applicants were forced to board boats flying the Italian flag and staffed with Italian military personnel. 
According to the Court, ‘in the period between boarding the ships of the Italian armed forces and being 
handed over to the Libyan authorities, the applicants were under the continuous and exclusive de jure 
and de facto control of the Italian authorities’.130 In Xhavara, the ECtHR accepted that protection seekers 
on a vessel flying the Albanian flag came within Italy’s jurisdiction because an Italian navy ship collided 
with the Albanian vessel, leading to fifty-eight deaths. Different from Medvedev and Hirsi Jamaa, the 
applicants could not be said to be under the State’s ‘continuous’ control. The Court instead emphasised 
that the shipwreck was directly (albeit unintentionally) caused by the Italian vessel. In that context, it 
recalled that Article 2 ECHR not only obliges States to abstain from violating the right to life but also 
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to take the necessary positive measures to protect the right to life of individuals within their 
jurisdiction.131 
The second exception to the Court’s ‘primarily territorial’ interpretation of Article 1 ECHR concerns 
States exercising effective control of an area located outside their territory. Effective control of a 
foreign area establishes a presumption that the State has jurisdiction over all persons located within that 
area. This also applies where control is exercised by a local administration that only survives as a result 
of the State’s military or other (political, economic) support.132 In these cases, ‘the controlling State has 
the responsibility to secure, within the area under its control, the entire range of substantive rights set 
out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which it has ratified’.133 This applies not only to 
negative State obligations (to refrain from violating human rights) but also to positive State obligations 
(to protect human rights in the relationship between non-state actors). 
In Issa – a case concerning alleged violations of human rights by Turkish army officials during military 
operations in Northern Iraq – the ECtHR applied the ‘control over persons’ test next to the ‘control over 
an area’ test. Moreover, the Court emphasised that for the purpose of both tests, the illegality of state 
action (in international law) does not prevent an individual from coming within that State’s 
extraterritorial human rights jurisdiction: 
According to the relevant principles of international law, a State’s responsibility may be engaged 
where, as a consequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – that State in practice 
exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an 
area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control, whether 
it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration. … 
Moreover, a State may also be held accountable for violation of Convention rights and freedoms of 
persons who are in the territory of another State but who are found to be under the former State’s 
authority and control through its agents operating – whether lawfully or unlawfully – in the latter State. 
Accountability in such situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be 
interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of 
another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.134 
In Ilascu already considered in PART B with regard to Moldova’s human rights obligations, the ECtHR 
also found Russia in violation of the European Convention because it exercised, via the MRT, ‘overall 
control’ of the relevant area located on Moldovan territory: 
According to the relevant principles of international law, a State’s responsibility may be engaged 
where, as a consequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises in practice 
effective control of an area situated outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an 
area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control, whether 
it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration. 
It is not necessary to determine whether a Contracting Party actually exercises detailed control over 
the policies and actions of the authorities in the area situated outside its national territory, since even 
overall control of the area may engage the responsibility of the Contracting Party concerned. 
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Where a Contracting State exercises overall control over an area outside its national territory, its 
responsibility is not confined to the acts of its soldiers or officials in that area but also extends to acts 
of the local administration which survives there by virtue of its military and other support.135 
Effective control of an area outside the state’s territory can also yield positive obligations to protect 
human rights in the relationship between non-state actors. In Cyprus versus Turkey, the ECtHR held 
that Turkey’s human rights obligations as an occupying power in Northern Cyprus extended not only to 
acts of its own soldiers and officials as well as acts of the local administration (the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, TRNC), but also to the acts of private parties violating the rights of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. As regards the latter, the Court noted that ‘the acquiescence or connivance of authorities of a 
Contracting State in the acts of private individuals which violate the Convention rights of other 
individuals within its jurisdiction may engage that State’s responsibility under the Convention. Any 
different conclusion would be at variance with the obligation contained in Article 1 of the 
Convention’.136 In Isaak, the Court reaffirms and elaborates its approach to extraterritorial positive State 
obligations. The case concerned a demonstration in Northern Cyprus in the course of which one 
participant was beaten to death by private actors (the ‘Turkish mob’), while the Turkish Northern 
Cypriot authorities were present yet allegedly did not intervene to protect him. The Court reiterates that 
‘the acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of private individuals 
which violate the Convention rights of other individuals may engage that State’s responsibility under 
the Convention’. As in Issa with regard to negative extraterritorial State obligations, the ECtHR 
emphasises in Isaak that positive extraterritorial State obligations stem ‘from the fact that Article 1 of 
the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the 
Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory’.137 
The third exception to the ‘primarily territorial’ interpretation of Article 1 ECHR concerns the exercise 
of public powers on the territory of another State with the latter’s invitation, consent or acquiescence: 
‘The Court has recognised the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State 
when, through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, it 
exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government’.138 
Different from the first two constellations, jurisdiction under the ‘public powers’ approach is established 
not in virtue of ‘de facto’ control of a foreign area or persons therein but in virtue of a State exercising 
‘de jure’ authority outside its borders. That de jure authority can serve to establish extraterritorial human 
rights obligations should not be confused with a point noted previously, namely that the illegality of 
State action in international law (‘whether lawful or unlawful’) does not prevent an individual from 
coming within that State’s human rights jurisdiction.139 As in the case of Hirsi Jamaa already considered 
above, the ECtHR sometimes uses the de jure authority test next to the de facto control test to establish 
a State’s jurisdiction: 
The Court observes that in the instant case the events took place entirely on board ships of the Italian 
armed forces, the crews of which were composed exclusively of Italian military personnel. In the 
Court’s opinion, in the period between boarding the ships of the Italian armed forces and being handed 
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over to the Libyan authorities, the applicants were under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de 
facto control of the Italian authorities.140 
Following Ilascu, a State’s human rights jurisdiction does not cease when that State loses effective 
control of a portion of its own territory. Even though the relevant part of Moldova’s territory was 
controlled by a separatist regime (MRT), the Court considered that the State still had positive obligations 
‘to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that are in its power to take and are in 
accordance with international law to secure the applicants the rights guaranteed in the Convention’.141 
Absent de facto control, jurisdiction is established on the basis of the de jure authority (‘public powers’) 
that a State is presumed to exercise within its own borders.142 This approach was confirmed in the 
Court’s more recent Grand Chamber judgment in Sargsyan:  
Even in exceptional circumstances, when a State is prevented from exercising authority over part of 
its territory, due to military occupation by the armed forces of another State, acts of war or rebellion 
or the installation of a separatist regime within its territory, it does not cease to have jurisdiction within 
the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. … 
However, in cases in which a State is prevented from exercising its authority in part of its territory, its 
responsibility under the Convention is limited to discharging positive obligations. These relate both 
to measures needed to re-establish control over the territory in question, as an expression of its 
jurisdiction, and to measures to ensure respect for the applicant’s individual rights. Under the first 
head, the State has a duty to assert or re-assert its sovereignty over the territory and to refrain from 
any acts supporting the separatist regime. Under the second head the State must take judicial, political, 
or administrative measures to secure the applicant’s individual rights.143 
In Stephens, the ECtHR applied this ‘tailored’ approach to positive human rights obligations in an 
extraterritorial scenario. The applicant complained that he had been prevented from entering his house 
located in a UN buffer zone established between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot cease fire lines in 
Northern Cyprus. The Court noted that neither Cyprus nor Turkey were in control of the area in question. 
Recalling Ilascu, the Court found the application inadmissible, yet not for lack of effective control but 
because the applicant had failed to challenge ‘a particular action or inaction by these States or otherwise 
substantiated any breach by the said States of their duty to take all the appropriate measures with regard 
to the applicant’s rights which are still within their power to take’.144 
While the ECtHR’s approach to extraterritorial human rights protection has evolved considerably since 
its 2001 admissibility decision in Bankovic, the first prong of its jurisdictional test that focuses on ‘acts 
performed outside the State’s territory’ appears of limited value to the business and human rights 
domain because it is premised on the physical presence of State agents outside the State’s territory. 
Traditional variations of the ‘control over persons’ test (diplomatic protection; abduction; interception 
of vessels), the ‘control over an area test’ (military intervention and interception) and the ‘public powers’ 
test focus on a jurisdictional link established between State agents operating abroad and victims of 
human rights violations located on the territory of another State. In the standard business and human 
rights scenario, by contrast, the extraterritorial human rights violation will be committed by a corporate 
(non-state) actor, a constituent part of which (the parent company) is domiciled within the State’s 
territorial jurisdiction and thus under its de facto and de jure control. Where corporate conduct is 
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directly attributable to the State (i.e., corporations acting as state agents), extraterritorial corporate 
human rights abuse can bring an individual under that State’s human rights jurisdiction.145 The Court’s 
approach to positive extraterritorial human rights obligations in situations of military intervention and 
occupation can be of help in addressing extraterritorial corporate human rights abuse in conflict-
affected areas.146 
State obligations to prevent corporate-related human rights violations in relation to acts producing 
effects outside the State’s territory  
A further exception to the ‘primarily territorial’ interpretation of Article 1 ECHR concerns acts of public 
authorities performed inside the State’s territory that produce effects outside the State’s territory: ‘The 
Court has recognised in its case-law that, as an exception to the principle of territoriality, a Contracting 
State’s jurisdiction under Article 1 may extend to acts of its authorities which produce effects outside 
its territory’.147 This category is less well-defined than the previous ones and not always easy to 
distinguish as it can be difficult to determine whether (the relevant part of) an act was ‘performed’ inside 
or outside the State’s borders. 
The best known examples of ‘extraterritorial effects’ cases concern the extradition or deportation of an 
individual to a country where she faces substantial risks of being subjected to serious human rights 
violations (non-refoulement).148 In these cases, the responsibility of the extraditing State is engaged in 
virtue of acts performed on its own territory that are likely to contribute to human rights violations in 
the receiving State: 
In sum, the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue 
under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, 
where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if 
extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment in the requesting country. The establishment of such responsibility inevitably 
involves an assessment of conditions in the requesting country against the standards of 
Article 3 of the Convention. Nonetheless, there is no question of adjudicating on or 
establishing the responsibility of the receiving country, whether under general international 
law, under the Convention or otherwise. In so far as any liability under the Convention is or 
may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its 
having taken action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to 
proscribed ill-treatment.149 
While the ECtHR’s factsheet on extraterritoriality includes these non-refoulement cases,150 they do not 
amount to an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction proper because the individual is at the relevant time 
of the act located on the State’s territory. As the Court notes in Bankovic, because ‘liability is incurred 
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in such cases by an action of the respondent State concerning a person while he or she is on its territory, 
clearly within its jurisdiction, … such cases do not concern the actual exercise of a State’s competence 
or jurisdiction abroad’.151 The Court’s non-refoulement jurisprudence is nevertheless significant for the 
present purpose because it indicates that a State can be held accountable for acts performed within 
its territorial jurisdiction that facilitate or contribute to human rights violations committed on the 
territory of another State. 
Significantly, the protection in non-refoulement cases extends to threats to human rights that emanate 
from private (non-state) actors abroad. In Ahmed, the applicant complained that his expulsion to 
Somalia – at the time plagued by an internal armed conflict – would put him at risk of serious human 
rights violations by the faction of General Aideed, a non-state actor. The European Commission of 
Human Rights unanimously found that the applicant’s expulsion would amount to a violation of Article 
3 ECHR: ‘It is sufficient that those who hold substantial power within the State, even though they are 
not the Government, threaten the life and security of the applicant’.152 In HLR v. France, the risk of 
human rights violations emanated from a criminal organisation involved in drug trafficking in Colombia. 
While the application was unsuccessful on the facts, the Court accepted that the protection of Article 3 
ECHR could extend to threats emanating from private actors, particularly in situations where the public 
authorities of the receiving State are unable to afford sufficient protection to the individual.153 This 
principle has been consolidated in the Court’s more recent case-law. In J.K. and Others v. Sweden, for 
example, the applicants successfully argued that their deportation to Iraq would amount to a violation 
of Article 3 ECHR. The first applicant and his family found themselves targeted by al-Qaeda for having 
offered construction and transport services to American clients in Iraq. The ECtHR, sitting as Grand 
Chamber, held that Article 3 also applies ‘where the danger emanates from persons or groups of persons 
who are not public officials. However, it must be shown that the risk is real and that the authorities of 
the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection’.154 
The ECtHR has furthermore found States under an obligation to regulate and control private actors 
within their territorial jurisdiction in order to prevent human rights violations committed outside 
their borders. Rantsev concerned the death of a woman who had allegedly been illegally trafficked by 
a non-State actor from Russia to Cyprus to work as a prostitute.155 Of interest for the present purpose is 
the ECtHR’s assessment of Russia’s responsibility for Ms Rantseva’s death in Cyprus. The applicant, 
Ms Rantseva’s father, complained that the failure of Russian public authorities to protect his daughter 
from human trafficking and to investigate her removal from Russian territory and subsequent death in 
Cyprus amounted to a violation of inter alia Article 2 and Article 4 ECHR. The Russian Government 
submitted that the application was inadmissible ratione loci because the relevant events took place 
outside its borders. In particular, the State had no ‘actual authority’ over the territory of the Republic of 
Cyprus. The Court instead focussed on Russia’s responsibility for acts and omissions within its own 
territorial jurisdiction: 
The applicant’s complaints against Russia in the present case concern the latter’s alleged failure to 
take the necessary measures to protect Ms Rantseva from the risk of trafficking and exploitation and 
to conduct an investigation into the circumstances of her arrival in Cyprus, her employment there and 
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her subsequent death. The Court observes that such complaints are not predicated on the assertion that 
Russia was responsible for acts committed in Cyprus or by the Cypriot authorities. In the light of the 
fact that the alleged trafficking commenced in Russia and in view of the obligations undertaken by 
Russia to combat trafficking, it is not outside the Court’s competence to examine whether Russia 
complied with any obligation it may have had to take measures within the limits of its own jurisdiction 
and powers to protect Ms Rantseva from trafficking and to investigate the possibility that she has been 
trafficked. Similarly, the applicant’s Article 2 complaint against the Russian authorities concerns their 
failure to take investigative measures, including securing evidence from witnesses resident in Russia. 
It is for the Court to assess in its examination of the merits of the applicant’s Article 2 complaint the 
extent of any procedural obligation incumbent on the Russian authorities and whether any such 
obligation was discharged in the circumstances of the present case.156 
This approach was confirmed in the more recent case of M. and Others v Italy and Bulgaria where the 
Court considered itself competent ‘to examine whether Bulgaria complied with any obligation it may 
have had to take measures within the limits of its own jurisdiction and powers to protect the first 
applicant from trafficking and to investigate the possibility that she had been trafficked’.157 
Both in non-refoulement cases (where the threat to human rights emanates from a private actor abroad) 
and in the Rantsev scenario (where a private actor within the State’s territorial jurisdiction contributes 
to human rights violations that materialise in a third State), the necessary jurisdictional link is established 
through the victim’s presence on the State’s territory. This appears the main difference to the approach 
taken by the UN Treaty Bodies according to which a State’s ‘control, power or authority over business 
entities’ is sufficient to trigger extraterritorial human rights obligations even if the individual is 
permanently located outside the State’s borders.158 However, there are a number of extraterritorial 
effects cases in which the Strasbourg organs seem to dispense with the requirement that the 
applicant must be located on the State’s territory. 
The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber judgment in Nada concerned Switzerland’s decision to enforce a UN 
Security Council travel ban by denying the applicant entry into Swiss territory from the Italian enclave 
of Campione. The ECtHR found the Switzerland in violation of Articles 8 and 13 of the European 
Convention without considering the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction, even though the applicant was 
affected by a decision of Swiss public authorities while located on the territory of another State.159 On 
the facts, the early case of X and Y versus Switzerland is rather similar to Nada. The applicant, a German 
citizen, complained that he was denied entry into Liechtenstein by order of the Swiss Federal Aliens’ 
Police, based on an international treaty agreement between Liechtenstein and Switzerland.160 According 
to the European Commission of Human Rights, Switzerland was ‘responsible’ under Article 1 ECHR 
not only ‘for the effect which the prohibition of entry produced in its own territory’ but also ‘insofar as 
the prohibition of entry produced an effect in Liechtenstein’. According to the special treaty relationship 
between the two countries, ‘it was Swiss jurisdiction which was used and extended to Liechtenstein’. 
Accordingly, ‘acts by Swiss authorities with effect in Liechtenstein bring all those to whom they apply 
under Swiss jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention’.161  
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Kovacic concerned the domestic regulation of business activities by Slovenian public authorities that 
had extraterritorial effects on the applicants’ enjoyment of their human rights in Croatia. A Slovenian 
law prevented the applicants from withdrawing funds from their accounts in the Croatian branch of a 
Slovenian bank. The Slovenian government submitted that its obligation to secure property rights under 
Article 1 Protocol 1 was confined to property within its jurisdiction, and that none of the instances of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction recognised by the ECtHR was applicable in the present case. The Strasbourg 
Court, after reiterating that ‘the responsibility of the High Contracting Parties may be engaged by acts 
of their authorities that produce effects outside their own territory’, accepted that the banking legislation 
introduced by the Slovenian National Assembly ‘affected’ the applicants’ property rights in Croatia. 
‘This being so, the Court finds that the acts of the Slovenian authorities continue to produce effects, 
albeit outside Slovenian territory, such that Slovenia’s responsibility under the Convention could be 
engaged’.162  
In Treska, the applicants complained that Italy had inter alia violated their rights under Article 1 
Protocol 1 (the right to property) by purchasing premises from the Albanian Government in Albania 
which Italy knew or should have known had been confiscated without compensation. While on the basis 
of the alleged facts the ECtHR did not find the applicants within Italian jurisdiction, it applied its Ilascu 
jurisprudence on positive state obligations in an extraterritorial effects case: ‘Even in the absence of 
effective control of a territory outside its borders, the State still has a positive obligation under 
Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that it is in its 
power to take and are in accordance with international law to secure to applicants the rights guaranteed 
by the Convention’.163  These cases may suggest a gradual de-centring of human rights obligations 
from State territory, which would bring the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 1 ECHR in line with the 
approach taken by the UN Human Rights Committee. According to the Committee, ‘jurisdiction’ under 
Article 2(1) ICCPR is established on the basis of ‘the relationship between the individual and the State 
in relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred’.164 This 
approach, whether based on de facto control or de jure authority, finds further support in the Concurring 
Opinion of Judge Bonello in Al Skeini: 
Jurisdiction means no less and no more than ‘authority over’ and ‘control of’. In relation to 
Convention obligations, jurisdiction is neither territorial nor extraterritorial: it ought to be 
functional … The duties assumed through ratifying the Convention go hand in hand with the 
duty to perform and observe them. Jurisdiction arises from the mere fact of having assumed 
those obligations and from having the capacity to fulfil them (or not to fulfil them.165 
What is clear is that provided there is a tangible jurisdictional link between the State and an individual 
located outside its borders, that State can incur obligations to secure human rights against 
extraterritorial corporate abuse. What remains less clear is whether the necessary jurisdictional link 
with the victim can be established by virtue of (de facto or de jure) control that the State exercises over 
(constituent parts of) the corporate perpetrator of human rights violations domiciled within its territorial 
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jurisdiction.166 Also in this regard, Judge Bonello’s ‘capacity’ approach to jurisdiction in Al Skeini could 
be helpful to accommodate the view of the UN Treaty Bodies, namely that extraterritorial obligations 
arise when States may exercise control, power or authority over business entities in a way that impacts 
on the enjoyment of human rights abroad.167  
State obligations to redress corporate-related human rights violations committed outside the State’s 
territory 
The European Convention, as international human rights law more generally, imposes obligations on 
States to redress corporate-related human rights violations. This includes ensuring victims’ access to 
justice and effective remedies in private (tort) litigations for corporate human rights abuse. According 
to the UNGPs, ‘States should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial 
mechanisms when addressing business-related human rights abuses, including considering ways to 
reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy’.168 In 
particular, States should ‘ensure that they do not erect barriers to prevent legitimate cases from being 
brought before the courts in situations where judicial recourse is an essential part of accessing remedy 
or alternative sources of remedy are unavailable’. This also applies to cross-border litigations where 
‘claimants face a denial of justice in a host State and cannot access home State courts regardless of the 
merits of the claim’.169  
As public institutions of the State, domestic courts adjudicating disputes between private parties are 
directly bound by the European Convention on Human Rights.170 Of particular relevance in this regard 
are Article 6 ECHR that requires States to ensure that victims have access to court to vindicate their 
civil rights protected under domestic law;171 and Article 13 ECHR that guarantees an effective remedy 
before a national authority to everyone who claims that their rights under the European Convention have 
been violated.172 To the extent that the ECHR applies extraterritorially, States are duty-bound to 
ensure access to justice and effective civil remedies for third-country victims of corporate-related 
human rights violations.  
Many cases engaging Article 6 ECHR in an extraterritorial scenario concern the involvement of the 
public organs of one State in judicial proceedings between private parties in another State. These 
cases can be subsumed, as the ECtHR does in Al Skeini, under the category of acts of public authorities 
which ‘produce effects’ outside the State’s territory.173 They commonly also involve the (alleged) 
exercise of public powers on the territory of another State with the latter’s invitation, consent, or 
acquiescence. In the early case of Drozd & Jaousek v France and Spain, the applicants had been 
convicted by Andorran courts for an armed robbery committed in Andorra. Before the ECtHR, the 
applicants submitted that France and Spain should be held accountable for alleged violations of their 
fair trial rights by Andorran courts because at the time both States were responsible for the appointment 
of judges and the administration of justice in Andorra. The Strasbourg Court considered that ‘jurisdiction 
is not limited to the national territory of the High Contracting Parties; their responsibility can be involved 
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because of acts of their authorities producing effects outside their own territory’. Accordingly, ‘the 
question to be decided here is whether the acts complained of by Mr Drozd and Mr. Janousek can be 
attributed to France or Spain or both, even though there were not performed on the territory of those 
States’.174 On the facts, the ECtHR did not find the applicants within France’ or Spain’s jurisdiction 
because the judges they had appointed acted in their capacity as members of the Andorran judiciary. 
While the Court did not consider that the defendant States had to verify the proceedings before the 
Andorran Courts in the light of Article 6 ECHR, it emphasised the obligation of Convention States ‘to 
refuse their cooperation’ with other States if it emerges that an act of the other State is ‘the result of a 
flagrant denial of justice’.175 
To date, applications following the reasoning of Drozd & Janousek have largely been unsuccessful. In 
McElhinney, the applicant complained that, by invoking and applying the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, the United Kingdom violated his rights under Article 6 ECHR in judicial proceedings before 
Irish courts concerning his compensation claim for an alleged assault by a British soldier on the territory 
of the Republic of Ireland: 
In so far as the applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the stance taken by 
the Government of the United Kingdom in the Irish proceedings, the Court does not consider it 
necessary to address in the abstract the question of whether the actions of a Government as a litigant 
before the courts of another Contracting State can engage their responsibility under Article 6 § 1 of 
the Convention. The Court considers that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the fact that the 
United Kingdom Government raised the defence of sovereign immunity before the Irish courts, where 
the applicant had decided to sue, does not suffice to bring him within the jurisdiction of the United 
Kingdom within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.176 
Similarly, that the Swedish ambassador in Naku raised the defence of sovereign immunity in civil 
proceedings brought against Sweden in Lithuanian courts did not amount to an exercise of jurisdiction 
by the Swedish State over the applicant.177 Kalogeropoulou concerned a civil action in Greek courts 
brought by 257 relatives of the victims of a massacre perpetrated by Nazi occupation forces, with a view 
to obtaining compensation from the German State. Despite Germany having raised the defence of 
sovereign immunity, the Greek courts found in favour of the applicants. Subsequently, the Greek 
Minister of Justice prevented the applicants from bringing enforcement proceedings against Germany, 
a decision that was confirmed by the Greek courts. The ECtHR did not find the applicants under German 
jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR because ‘the proceedings were conducted exclusively 
in Greece and the Greek courts were the only bodies with sovereign power over the applicants’, while 
‘the German courts had no direct or indirect influence over the decisions and judgments delivered in 
Greece’.178 
Of greater relevance to the business and human rights domain are cases in which individuals located 
outside the State’s territory seek redress for (corporate) human rights violations in the domestic courts 
of that State. The ECtHR’s case-law in this area suggests that States exercise jurisdiction within the 
meaning of Article 1 ECHR over third-country victims of (corporate-related) human rights 
violations that bring criminal or civil proceedings in their domestic courts. In Ben El Mahi, the 
Morocco-based applicants complained about the publication of Muhammed cartoons in privately owned 
Danish newspapers. They alleged that the State’s failure to prevent the publication of the caricatures 
which also circulated in Morocco violated their human rights under the European Convention. The 
ECtHR declared the application inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction:  
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Here the applicants are a Moroccan national resident in Morocco and two Moroccan associations 
which are based in morocco and operate in that country. The Court considers that there is no 
jurisdictional link between any of the applicants and the relevant member State, namely Denmark, or 
that they can come within the jurisdiction of Denmark on account of any extraterritorial act. 
Accordingly, the Court has no competence to examine the applicants’ substantive complaints under 
the Articles of the Convention relied upon.179 
The case of White versus Sweden concerned a similar factual scenario and was decided within days after 
Ben El Mahi. The applicant lived in Mozambique and complained that two publications in Swedish 
newspapers associating him with various crimes (including the murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme) 
violated his right to private and family life (Article 8 ECHR). Different from the applicants in Ben El 
Mahi, Mr White had brought private prosecution for defamation against the newspapers in Sweden 
before turning to the Strasbourg Court. The responsible editors were acquitted by a Swedish District 
Court, a judgment that was upheld on appeal. Without further ado, the ECtHR found the applicant under 
Swedish jurisdiction, simply noting that ‘this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded … [nor] 
inadmissible on any other grounds’.180 With both the applicants in Ben El Mahi and White located 
outside the State’s territory, the decisive difference appears to be that Mr White’s attempt to vindicate 
his rights in Sweden had brought him under that State’s jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 
ECHR. 
In Markovic, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights had to consider whether 
individuals located outside the State’s territory could benefit from Article 6 ECHR (access to court) 
when attempting to bring civil proceedings in the domestic courts of that State.181 The facts of the case 
relate to the same events as those considered by the Court in Bankovic, namely the 1999 NATO airstrikes 
on the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. In 2000, the applicants had brought a civil action for damages 
against the Italian government in the Italian courts. The Italian Court of Cassation eventually dismissed 
the action for lack of jurisdiction because the claimants were not entitled under Italian law to seek 
reparation from the Italian State for civil damages incurred as a result of an alleged violation of public 
international law. In Strasbourg, the applicants complained that the Court of Cassation’s ruling violated 
their human rights under Article 6 ECHR in conjunction with Article 1 ECHR. The Grand Chamber first 
distinguished Markovic from Bankovic: 
[In Bankovic, the Court] did not find any ‘jurisdictional link’ for the purposes of Article 1 of the 
Convention between the victims of the act complained of and the respondent States and held that the 
action concerned did not engage the latter’s responsibility under the Convention. … However, as 
regards the complaint under Article 6 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of the Convention, the Court 
notes that in Bankovic and Others the respondent Government stressed that it was possible for 
proceedings to be brought in the Italian domestic courts, thus implying that the existence of a 
jurisdictional link could not be excluded for future complaints made on a different basis. …The Court 
does not share the view of the Italian and British Governments that the subsequent institution of 
proceedings at the national level does not give rise to any obligation on the part of the State towards 
the person bringing the proceedings.182 
On that basis, the Court unanimously held that the applicants came within Italy’s human rights 
jurisdiction: 
If the domestic law recognises a right to bring an action and if the right claimed is one which prima 
facie possesses the characteristics required by Article 6 of the Convention, the Court sees no reason 
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why such domestic proceedings should not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as any other 
proceedings brought at the national level. Even though the extraterritorial nature of the events alleged 
to have been at the origin of an action may have an effect on the applicability of Article 6 and the final 
outcome of the proceedings, it cannot under any circumstances affect the jurisdiction ratione loci and 
ratione personae of the State concerned.183 
The Court’s conclusions are rather far reaching: ‘Once a person brings a civil action in the courts or 
tribunals of a State, there indisputably exists, without prejudice to the outcome of the proceedings, a 
“jurisdictional link” for the purposes of Article 1’. Accordingly, ‘if civil proceedings are brought in the 
domestic courts, the State is required by Article 1 of the Convention to secure in those proceedings 
respect for the rights protected by Article 6’.184 
At the merits stage, the Court gave some further indication as to what is required by the European 
Convention in such cases. On the one hand, the protection of Article 6 ECHR extends only to disputes 
over civil rights and obligations ‘which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under 
domestic law; it does not itself guarantee any particular content for (civil) rights and obligations in the 
substantive law of the Contracting State’.185 Moreover, the right to access to court is not absolute but 
can be limited in domestic law, provided the limitation does not impair the essence of the right and 
pursues a legitimate aim through proportionate means.186 Yet on the other hand, the ECtHR cautioned 
that undue restrictions of access to court in domestic law may result in a denial of justice incompatible 
with Article 6: 
It would not be consistent with the rule of law in a democratic society or with the basic principle 
underlying Article 6 § 1 – namely that civil claims must be capable of being submitted to a judge for 
adjudication – if, for example, a State could, without restraint or control by the Convention 
enforcement bodies, remove from the jurisdiction of the courts a whole range of civil claims or confer 
immunities from civil liability on large groups or categories of persons.187 
If a victim of corporate-related human rights violations located outside the State’s territory brings civil 
proceedings in the domestic courts of that State, it comes under the latter’s human rights jurisdiction 
within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR. This entails that decisions of domestic courts must be in 
conformity with the ECHR.188 In exceptional cases where the victim faces a flagrant denial of justice, 
a domestic court’s decision to decline jurisdiction may be found in violation of Article 6 ECHR (forum 
necessitatis jurisdiction).189 Otherwise, the ECHR does not enshrine a right of victims to have their case 
decided by a civil court of a State party to the European Convention. But it does entail that domestic 
courts have to consider Article 6 when deciding upon their jurisdiction in private international 
law. Hence, while Article 6 ECHR does not oblige States to create any particular remedy, ‘it can be 
relied upon by anyone who considers that an interference with the exercise of one of his (civil) rights is 
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unlawful and complains that he has not had the possibility of submitting that claim to a tribunal meeting 
the requirements of Article 6 § 1’.190  
In Arlewin, the ECtHR reviewed a domestic court’s decision to decline jurisdiction in private 
international law in the light of the European Convention.191 The applicant complained that the refusal 
of Swedish courts to accept jurisdiction in a defamation case he had brought against a television program 
that was produced in Sweden but broadcasted by a company domiciled in the UK violated his rights 
under Article 6 ECHR. The Strasbourg Court agreed: 
[T]here were strong connections between Sweden, on the one hand, and the television program and 
the UK company responsible for the program contents and involved in its broadcasts, on the other. 
These circumstances are sufficient to conclude that there was a prima facie obligation on the Swedish 
State to secure the applicant’s rights, including the right to access to court.192 
The ECtHR further noted that ‘the possible access of the applicant to a court in a different country, 
namely the United Kingdom, does not affect Sweden’s responsibility as such under Article 1, but is 
rather a factor to consider in determining whether the lack of access to a court in Sweden, in the 
particular circumstances of the case, was proportionate under Article 6’.193 On the merits, the Court 
concluded that ‘the Swedish State had an obligation, under Article 6, to provide the applicant with an 
effective access to court’ because instituting defamation proceedings in the UK did not constitute a 
‘reasonable and practicable alternative’.194 
Conclusion 
The study reviewed case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in two areas of international legal 
doctrine of particular relevance to business and human rights: the application of international human 
rights law to corporate-related human rights violations (the public/private divide); and the jurisdictional 
reach of international human rights treaties (the territoriality/extraterritoriality divide). The overall focus 
of the study was on a scenario of particular relevance to the business and human rights domain, namely 
human rights obligations of the home state of the parent or controlling company of ‘multi-national’ 
corporations to protect third-country victims against extraterritorial corporate abuse. 
While the European Convention does not directly bind corporations as non-state actors, it imposes 
negative and positive obligations on States to secure human rights against corporate abuse. Focussing 
on corporate-related human rights violations in the environmental sphere, the study distinguished three 
types of State obligations: substantive obligations to regulate and control corporate operations including 
the licensing, setting up and supervision of dangerous activities and the provision of information about 
such activities to the general public; procedural obligations to ensure an informed decision-making 
process that involves public participation, public investigations, scientific studies and environmental 
impact assessments; and obligations relating to law enforcement and the judicial process, including 
access to justice and the provision of effective remedies. 
While the ECtHR’s approach to extraterritorial human rights protection has significantly evolved over 
the past years, it remains premised upon an essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction. While, 
accordingly, the extraterritorial application of the European Convention remains the exception, the 
Court has given State obligations to secure human rights ‘to everyone within their jurisdiction’ (Article 
1 ECHR) an increasingly broad interpretation that encompasses acts performed outside the State’s 
                                                     
190 E. Ct. H. R., Marković and Others v Italy (Grand Chamber Judgment of 14 December 2006) para 98. 
191 E. Ct. H. R., Arlewin v Sweden (Judgment of 1 March 2016). 
192 Id. para 65. 
193 Id. para 65. 
194 Id. para 73. 
State obligations to regulate and adjudicate corporate activities under the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
European University Institute 37 
territory and acts producing effects outside the State’s territory. The category of acts performed outside 
the State’s territory is of limited value to the business and human rights domain because it requires the 
physical presence of State agents on the territory of another State. While extraterritorial effects cases 
appear more promising in this regard the ECtHR has not (yet) endorsed the view of the UN Treaty 
Bodies according to which a State’s exercise of authority and control over a corporation domiciled 
within its territory is sufficient to establish a jurisdictional link with a victim located outside its borders. 
The Court’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the context of access to justice, finally, suggests 
that once an individual located outside the State’s territory brings criminal or civil proceedings in the 
domestic courts of that State, it comes under the latter’s human rights jurisdiction within the meaning 
of Article 1 ECHR.
  
 
